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Judicial Review of Military
Administrative Decisions
By JOHN MICHAEL HAGGERTY*
Judges are not given the task of running the Army.
Justice Jackson'
From time to time, civilian courts deal with the problem of wheth-
er-and how-to review military administrative determinations. The
extreme traditional position, still taken by many courts, is that such
decisions are simply not reviewable. Orlof v. Willoughby,' a Korean-
war era Supreme Court decision, is probably the most frequently cited
authority for this position. But several recent decisions3 have suggested
that review is proper, and in fact required, where important personal
rights are at stake. No systematic theory exists to guide courts through
the whether's and how's of this very delicate subject, and the relevant
decisions are in disarray.
There are two distinct approaches. One, exemplified in the cases
following Orloff,4 regards the military as so fundamentally different
from civilian agencies that unique principles govern judicial review of all
* Member, California bar.
1. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953).
2. Id. Orloff had been drafted under a special statute, for service as a doctor
during the Korean conflict. After he refused as a niatter of conscience to answer ques-
tions about membership in organizations on the "Attorney General's List" he was denied
a commission. The Army then refused to assign him duties as a physician because he
had no commission. Id. at 84-86. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Jack-
son, denied relief, holding in an opinion characterized by lack of citations to authority
that Orloff had no right to the commission as such, id. at 90-91, and that review of
assignment decisions, once subjection to military control was found proper, was beyond
the scope of habeas corpus. Id. at 92. There were vigorous dissents by Justices Black,
id. at 95, and Frankfurter, id. at 97, who joined each other and were also joined by Jus-
tice Douglas. It is interesting to ponder the degree to which the majority position may
have been affected by the political climate of the times.
3. See note 90 infra and text accompanying. See also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395
U.S. 258 (1969).
4. See note 90 infra (cases refusing to find jurisdiction). These cases do not,
strictly speaking, follow Orloff, since they deal with other bases of jurisdiction; but the
viewpoint of the court in each is guided by the general viewpoint of the majority in
Orloff.
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military acts. The other, regarding the armed services as governmental
agencies simpliciter, presumes their acts to be reviewable on the same
basis as actions of civilian agencies-with the awareness that certain
governmental interests exist in the field of arms that are unique to it,
and therefore must be accounted for in the review process.
Even those courts disposed actively to review have accorded special
deference to military determinations where the service seems to have
expertise or experience not shared by the court, or where certain matters
appear to -have been left by Congress to the discretion of military
decision-makers. 5 The fact that military justice is an Article I rather
than an Article III power under the constitution,6 though not directly
relevant in the field of administrative law, has no doubt also contributed
to judicial reluctance to intervene in administrative decisions. One
might also anticipate judicial apprehension that if civilian courts inter-
fere too much with a powerful military, it may choose to return the
favor. The reasons for caution, especially deference to military exper-
tise and experience, are compelling.1
Also compelling, however, are claims for protection of private
rights. It is the function of courts to safeguard those interests by
providing a check on the other branches of government in their rela-
tions with citizens;8 such rights are meaningless unless they are en-
forced. The court's problem is to take into account factors peculiar to
the military, including unique interests and experience, in deciding
proper boundaries for their own intervention.
This article examines recent decisions and current issues in an
attempt to bridge the gap between the two judicial attitudes. It empha-
sizes familiar legal principles which can contribute to more objective
decision-making in this often emotion-charged field. The case of
Leonard Matlovich, 9 an Air Force technical sergeant recently dis-
5. See, e.g., Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971). See note 19 infra,
and see Note, Constitutional Law-Judicial Review-Civilian Interference with Military
Administrative Decisions, 47 TuLANE L.R. 418 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Interference],
and cases cited therein.
6. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
7. Concerning judicial reluctance to intervene and some of the reasons behind it,
see Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181, 186-87 (1962).
8. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally
K. DAVIS, ADrmiSTmTIVE LAw TExT § 28.07 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS].
9. Matlovich's discharge was recommended by a board which met at Langley
AFB, Virginia, and rendered its decision on September 19, 1975. He was discharged
in late October, 1975, after the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
declined to restrain the service's execution of the discharge. The matter is presently in
preliminary motion stages. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, Civil No. 75-
1750 (D.C.D.C. Oct 28, 1975); N.Y. Times, 20 Sept. 1975, § 1 at 1, col. 2; id. at
15, col. 3; N.Y. Times, 22 Oct. 1975, § I at 62, col. 1.
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charged for homosexuality, is referred to from time to time to place the
issues in focus; other possible problems are also sketched briefly to help
clarify the analysis.
L Points of Departure
It seems settled-if only recently-that the constitution protects
members of the military as well as civilians.' 0 On the other hand, it also
is clear that in certain cases peculiar necessities of military life may
constitutionally override individual interests." Whatever the eventual
balance of interests, the Constitution together with the guarantee of
human rights it embodies extends to individuals within the military
services, and where this fundamental law reaches, the courts have a
corresponding duty to make it effective. It follows that the courts
bearing this burden must look to the merits of controversies according to
some logical process, defining in each factual situation presented to
them the peculiarly military necessities that may be present and weigh-
ing these against the individual rights at stake. Just how the courts
should discharge this constitutional duty has been addressed in recent
appellate opinions.
A. Representative Cases
In Yahr v. Resor,'2 a 1970 case, the Fourth Circuit instructed a
lower court to examine the merits of two soldiers' claims against a post
commander who had refused to let them distribute an antiwar newspa-
per on post. The men claimed deprivation of their First Amendment
right to publish political commentary. The circuit court panel assumed
that the Constitution applies within the military services, and suggested
10. See Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970); United
States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960) (the defini-
tive statement by the highest military appeals court). But see T. EMERsoN, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSiON 56-57 (1970), on the problem of defining the way in which
the Constitution applies. And note also the possible restrictive effect that Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), may have on constitutional rights vis-a-vis the military serv-
ices. Cf. Justice Douglas' dissent in Levy. 417 U.S. 737, 766-67 (1974). The majority
opinion appears to resurrect the judicial deference to assertions of military necessity that
had been downplayed if not abandoned in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). In
O'Callahan the Court had held that for an off-post crime to be cognizable in a court-
martial it must affect military status or discipline (be "military-related"). The signifi-
cance of the opinion in the present context is that the Court's refusal there to accept
mere assertions of relatedness without proof suggests that it is proper for courts to in-
quire into military determinations to see if they are sound in logic and have factual sup-
port.
11. The clearest examples are in the speech cases. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974), and cases cited therein.
12. 431 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1970).
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standards for deciding how constitutional rights might be legitimately
limited, while refusing to interfere immediately with the commander's
action. The court's position rested on the ground that "servicemen are
entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights, except where military
exigencies, such as security and discipline, by necessary implication
restrict their applicability."' 3
Finding that the judge below had not abused his discretion by
refusing the immediate relief sought, the court nonetheless remanded for
a full consideration of the merits of the claim, outlining what the judge
below should ask in deciding the issue:
[P]arties should brief, and the district judge should decide, the
appropriate standard of review of the Commanding General's de-
cision. The district court should also find which articles, specific-
ally, constituted a basis for the decision to exclude and why the
Commanding General deemed them "a clear danger to the loyalty,
discipline and morale" of the military personnel at Fort Bragg.
Only upon a complete record supplying these facts can it be deter-
mined whether the Commanding General had a proper basis for
denying the applications. .... 14
Unfortunately, the district court decided that the appropriate stan-
dard for review was no review at all, responding to the first part of the
quoted directions and wholly ignoring the balance. The lower court
dismissed after concluding that it had no jurisdiction to review a com-
mander's action under any of the available federal statutes, despite the
circuit court's clear implication to the contrary.'" The lower court's
decision was apparently never appealed.
However unhelpful the ultimate result in Yahr, the circuit court
opinion still offers an approach to review that accounts for both the duty
of the district court to safeguard individual rights, and its concurrent
duty to respect the military decision-maker's sphere. The circuit court
opinion would require that the commander first identify the objection-
able material, and then state why it is objectionable. The court would
then assess that determination on some scale of reasonableness.'" Thus
Yahr suggests that, given a prima facie showing of deprivation of at
least this kind of constitutional right, 17 there is a burden on the service
to state its grounds and reasons, which the court will then subject to an
13. Id. at 691, citing Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47
(1960).
14. 431F.2dat691.
15. Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964, 969 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
16. The particular test to apply was implicitly left to the parties and the court be-
low. 431 F.2d at 691.
17. The constitutional right at issue was First Amendment political publication,
generally recognized as enjoying exceptional protection. The same activist position
might not have been taken by the circuit court if some less weighty right had been at
stake.
[Vol. 3
as yet undefined test of propriety. This might be a minimal burden
depending on how carefully the court examines the service's reasoning,"8
but it is not the complete abdication of review indulged in by the district
court.
A year after the circuit court decision in Yahr, in Cortright v.
Resor,'9 the Second Circuit considered similar questions. Plaintiffs in
the case argued that they had been transferred as punishment for their
political activities, and asked the court to rescind the transfers. The
court examined in detail the decision-making conduct of the two com-
manders involved, and concluded that their actions in transferring the
plaintiffs were justified. The court held, reversing the district court,
that relief was not appropriate on the facts but continued: "We do not
say that a case could never arise where a transfer order could be
invalidated by a civilian court on such a basis. 20
Seemingly both a more severe deprivation of individual rights and
less careful action by a commander would have been required to justify
relief. But the opinion's lesson lies in the judges' extended examination
of the actions, in this sacrosanct discretionary domain, of the two com-
manders involved. 2 This scrutiny constituted genuine judicial review
18. See notes 47-50 inlra and text accompanying. The possibilities range from a
perfunctory minimum rationality approach, through some sophisticated tests, to the strin-
gent compelling state interest test applied in certain circumstances in equal protection
analysis.
19. 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971). Cortright, a member of an Army band unit,
had been transferred from New York to Texas in response to his antiwar activism. He
and others had circulated a petition among unit members condemning the Vietnam war,
and published it in the New York Times. Later there was internal dissension caused
at least in part by their activities, and in one instance the wives and fiancees of several
men marched alongside the band at a parade carrying antiwar banners. The immediate
commander recommended, and his superiors carried out, a transfer of Cortright and oth-
ers as part of an already-planned reduction in the unit's size, but concededly in an effort
to alleviate the disruption caused by their activities.
20. Id. at 246.
21. Id. at 254-55. Another article, reviewing Cortright, criticizes the Second Cir-
cuit for disregarding the district court's factual findings, agreeing with the dissenting
judge that the lower court's findings were binding. See Interference, supra note 5. But
the earlier opinion appears to rest on the finding that the transfers were ordered to stifle
antiwar activities. Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). That
finding was held to be clearly erroneous in the Second Circuit opinion. 447 F.2d at
252, n.7. The appeals court concluded that the transfers were ordered in response to
activities of wives and fiancees incited by the petitioners, 447 F.2d at 252-53, again con-
tradicting the lower court. See 325 F. Supp. at 823.
As Judge Oakes' dissent points out, appellate courts will not normally disturb the
factual findings below if reasonable persons could have drawn the same inferences. 447
F.2d at 255, 257. But the case before him was not an ordinary one. The lower court
had before it an Article 138 proceeding (complaint against the commander-see 325 F.
Supp. at 818.) where it had been concluded after full investigation of the circumstances
that the commanders' actions did not violate the petitioners' rights. The court found
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of the decision-making process. Unfortunately, apart from bowing
formally to Orloff and noting a more modem recognition of the limits
on civilian courts' power to review military decisions,22 Judge Friendly
did not fully state his guiding standards in the Cortright decision.
In the same year, the Fifth Circuit took a more ambitious approach
in Mindes v. Seaman,2 3 following its own earlier opinion in United
States v. Flower,2 4 where it had held that courts may decide whether
military administrative decisions are arbitrary or capricious. In Mindes
Judge Clark essayed a set of principles systematically approaching the
question of whether or not a court should review a particular military
decision, and outlining factors a judge should weigh in coming to a
decision.2 5 Those principles are not altogether satisfactory. Nonethe-
less, they are the fullest judicial statement to date, and can serve as a
starting point for construction of a more satisfactory set of principles.
B. The Approach in Mindes v. Seaman
Captain Milbert Mindes had sought for some time to void what he
asserted was a factually erroneous Officer Effectiveness Report, on the
basis of which he had been denied promotion and had been forced from
active duty. 6 After exhausting administrative remedies, he brought
the Article 138 investigating officer's conclusion to be arbitrary and capricious and thus
held that it was not bound by it. But the lower court's finding on this matter amounts
to a conclusion of law, resting as it does on the court's assessment of the record before
it. The same is true of the "conclusion on facts and law" that comes at the end of the
lower court's opinion. See 325 F. Supp. at 818, 827. Conclusions of law are open to
reexamination by reviewing courts, and it was not improper therefore for the Second
Circuit to in effect reinstate the findings of the Article 138 investigation.
Even if the circuit court's action were reversed, the impact would be to broaden
rather than restrict the scope of judicial inquiry into military determinations. The court
below was not hesitant to examine the facts and circumstances and substitute its judg-
ment for that of the military commander, even going so far as to order the petitioner's
transfer back to New York. Id. at 828.
22. Sanders v. Westmoreland, 2 S.S.L.R. 3157 (D.D.C. 1969), cited in 447 F.2d
at 246.
23. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), reversing and remanding for consideration of
the merits. Relief was denied by the district court in an unpublished opinion, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed on the merits. 501 F.2d 175 (1974).
24. 452 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1971), reversed, 407 U.S. 197 (1972). The reversal
does not weaken the part of the opinion relied on in Mindes because the Court reversed
on a factual distinction. Flower was an organizer for the American Friends Service
Committee and was charged with reentering an installation after receiving an expulsion
order, The circuit court had upheld the commander's expulsion action, stating in dictum
that it could ask if the commander had acted "arbitrarily or capriciously, without proper
justification . . . ." 452 F.2d at 86. The fact that First Amendment rights were at
stake renders the chosen standard suspect, but as a statement of the minimum a court can
require it seems correct.
25. 453 F.2d at 201-02.
26. See Ant FORCE MANUAL [hereinafter AFM] 36-12, § E, paras. 29 and 30, June
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suit in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief." The
district court denied a temporary restraining order, and dismissed with
prejudice for want of jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit vacated and
remanded, holding that the question was not one of jurisdiction.
In his opinion for the court, Judge Clark pointed out that though
some jurisdictional questions are involved, what is at stake is a "policy
akin to comity," '28 which involves judicial discretion. It follows that a
judge must go beneath the surface and examine the merits at least to the
limited extent necessary to the proper exercise of discretion. The
opinion then set forth an outline to guide lower courts in their delibera-
tions.
First, the plaintiff must allege: deprivation of some constitutional
right; military action in excess of congressionally granted authority; or
action in violation of the service's own directives.29 In short, some
legally cognizable damage must appear or the court cannot act.
Second, the court must also inquire whether the plaintiff has
exhausted administrative remedies. 30 It may not proceed if an available
procedure promises consideration of plaintiffs claim. Of course, the
review offered must in fact be meaningful and not simply another hurdle
to be crossed before plaintiff finally gets into court.31
The Leonard Matlovich discharge case illustrates these principles.
Having announced his homosexual orientation to his commander, Mat-
lovich was discharged on the recommendation of a board of officers. 32
Under normal circumstances, he would be required to take appeals
through service channels and then to the Board for Correction of
Military Records (BCMR).33  However, a federal court has accepted
the case and ordered argument, reasoning that BCMR review would be
futile.34 This conclusion is undoubtedly correct, as was the court's
28, 1973, establishing the standards and requirements involved. A recent Supreme Court
case, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), dealt with and found valid a similar
"up-or-out" provision.
27. 453 F.2d at 198.
28. Id. at 199. The word comity was used to distinguish the flexibility of this pol-
icy from the relative rigidity of standards like those governing jurisdiction.
29. Id. at 201.
30. Id.
31. See Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion
of Remedies Requirement, 48 MiL. L REv. 91, 110 (1970).
32. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1975, §
1, at 62, col. 1.
33. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1553 & 1554 establish service review boards for examination of
discharges. 10 U.S.C. § 1552 establishes a separate Board for Correction of Military
Records under each service secretary, at an echelon above the review boards.
34. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, Civil No. 75-1750 (D.C.D.C. Oct.
28, 1975).
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decision not to grant any order restraining the service from executing
Matlovich's discharge during the pendency of the litigation.35
Matlovich's interests are threatened in several important ways. He
stands to lose income, both present and future, if the discharge action is
upheld; -he will also lose any chance for retirement at the end of a career
to which he seems to have been committed. Apart from these financial
considerations, which implicate the due process clause, there are two
fundamental interests at stake: the right of privacy and the right of
association-in effect Matlovich's right to choose his own style of life in
an extremely personal matter.
The prerequisites of cognizable deprivation and exhaustion of rem-
edies are met, and so the court has before it a matter it can review. It
must then, according to Judge Clark in Mindes, balance four additional
factors in deciding whether or not it will review. Those factors together
comprise the "policy akin to comity" with which the court is concerned.
They are:
a) The nature and strength of plaintiff's challenge,
b) The potential injury to plaintiff if no relief is granted;
c) The type and degree of expected interference with the military
(it must "seriously" impede "vital" duties to militate against review);
d) The extent to which military expertise and discretion are in-
volved.36
Judge Clark gave no indication of how the four factors listed ought
to be balanced, leaving this question to the judgment of the trial court in
particular cases. He did not consider whether a plaintiff might, by
some adequate showing, shift the burden of proof to a defendant
military service. Nor did he suggest the kind of proof that might be
required of any party. These matters were explicitly left to the trial
court.37 Moreover, his fourth element threatens to engulf and render
surplusage the entire analytical structure, positing as it does an unde-
fined discretion or expertise to which the court might bow without
further explanation. The balancing of Judge Clark's four listed factors
thus needs fuller analysis.
C. A Little Help From Administrative Law
If there is merit in the notion that military decisions are presump-
tively reviowable on the same basis as those civilian agencies, 38 then the
35. See id. Refusal to grant the restraining order is in accord with basic equity
principles. The discharge order is fully reversible by the court after full consideration
of the merits.
36. 453 F.2d at 201-02.
37. Id. at 202.
38. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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theory of judicial review in -the civilian cases should have application to
the military. Approaches to review of civilian administrative actions
suggest ways to improve the analysis in Mindes.
An agency is charged with making certain decisions. If the court
makes the decisions instead, by substituting its judgment for that of the
agency on review, it has usurped a function that properly belongs to
the agency. Thus the judicial role is limited, and might be described
generally as protecting individuals' rights vis-a-vis government by pre-
venting certain executive and legislative actions. The judicial function,
thus defined, is a negative one. From this flows the tradition of judicial
restraint in second-guessing agency determinations. 39  Courts are un-
derstandably reluctant to become involved where the possible usurpation
of functions is added to the normal judicial problem of justly balancing
rights. And they are even more reluctant where the executive agency
under review is an armed service.
Professor Kenneth Davis, in his text on adminstrative law, notes
both the difficulty of the task and the tradition of judicial deference.40
But he goes on to ask:
[I]f the President and Congress [and by implication the military,
an executive agency] are exceeding their constitutional power ...
might not the courts have the responsibility to decide no matter
how difficult the constitutional question might be?41
In this vein, Davis reaches some general conclusions about "unre-
viewable" administrative actions that might be applied to the military
as well:
American experience concerning judicial review of administra-
tive action seems strongly to support three fundamentals: (1) A
limited judicial review does not weaken the administrative process
but strengthens it. (2) Completely cutting off what the courts
have to offer to a governmental program may violate the cardinal
principle that functions should be allocated on the basis of com-
parative qualifications, for judges are specialists in constitutional
issues, in statutory interpretation, in enforcing the limits of fair
procedure, in assuring that findings are supported by substantial
evidence, and in assuring that discretion has not been abused.
(3) An independent check of administrative action is usually de-
sirable for the same reason that an appellate court's check upon
a trial court is desirable.42
When applied to the service, -however, this viewpoint is at war with
39. For a provocative argument on the proper standard for review of agency rule-
making, see Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of ludicial
Review, 59 CORNELL LR. 375, 385-95 (1974). And see generally DAvis, supra note
8.
40. DAvis, supra note 8, at 523.
41. Id. at 516.
42. Id. at 524.
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the traditional notion that military expertise and discretion militate
against judicial intervention. How are courts to respond to such asser-
tions? Can courts accord them their just due and at the same time
discharge their own constitutional function as guardians of individual
rights? The balance can be struck, but as Davis remarks, "[ingenuity
is needed to find ways to induce the judges to avoid an undue restriction
of the area of reviewability." 43
1. Expertise and Discretion
One helpful step is careful definition of terms. For example, if the
service claims expertise it suggests that its decision was a logical one.44
The court can then ask exactly what rational choice was made and
whether and how the service -has expertise with respect to that choice.
But if the service claims discretion, it may present a different problem.
Discretion under one definition implies the power to choose arbitrarily
among alternatives none of which is rationally preferable over the
others.45 A broader definition also includes the power to make rational
administrative decisions on a specified range of issues-in effect, to use
judgment and make binding determinations. The latter is probably the
definition most often appropriate in the cases.
If an exercise of discretion is indeed the power to make essentially
nonrational choices, courts really cannot reexamine the choosing. 40 But
if the discretion involved is merely the power to make rational judg-
ments and choices administratively, then the decision-making process
can be judicially reviewed without usurpation of executive functions.
Under this approach exercise of discretion is effectively the same thing
as application of expertise, so that whichever label is applied the analysis
proceeds from the same principle: the court looks at a rational decision
process and decides whether it has conformed to certain criteria of
propriety.
43. Id. at 516.
44. The service may draw on experience (and thus information) that is not within
the courts' experience, but its decision must still rest on rational assessment of the ques-
tion before it in light of that experience.
45. See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation In Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YAL L.J. 1205 (1970). It is this sort of authority the district court
thought it was dealing with in Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964, 967 (E.D.N.C. 1972),
and which the Supreme Court indicated in Orloff v. Willoughby. 345 U.S. 83 (1953),
the services enjoy with respect to assignment decisions (at least against habeas corpus
attack).
46. Where an otherwise apparently nonrational process produces a blatantly dis-
criminatory impact (particularly a racial one) it may be struck down solely on that
ground since the discriminatory impact suggests the presence of sub rosa illicit motiva-
tion. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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2. Review Criteria in Administrative Law
What are the criteria of propriety in administrative determinations?
They vary. The court's role is negative-to check agency acts that
trench too much upon protected rights. A respected federal judge has
suggested the following test in a deportation case where discretion
amounted to rational decision-making authority:
[the action] would be an abuse of discretion if it were made with-
out a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as an invidious
discrimination against a particular race or group, or, in Judge
Learned Hand's words, on other "considerations that Congress
could not have intended-to make relevant.14 7
In another case the principle was stated in briefer form: the person
affected by a determination has the judicially enforceable right "to
demand that the Secretary exercise his discretionary authority in a
manner consistent with the requirements of the Act and not arbitrarily
or capriciously." 8
In fact, the standard in each case may vary according to the right at
stake49 and the type of agency action involved.5° In no case, however,
will it amount to substitution of judicial for agency judgment. In the
case of agency rulemaking, in review under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act a court may merely require that the agency have honestly
considered all major factors, laying the burden on the agency to satisfy
the court of that much, but not inquiring into the substantive weighing
process and" the merits of the rule."l But when the agency has "adjudi-
cated" a particular individual's case, the court will be more intrusive,
47. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719
(2d Cir. 1966). Applying the enunciated standard, the court upheld the agency action
and Wong's consequent deportation.
48. DeVito v. Schultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D.D.C. 1969). This case involved
a determination by the secretary of labor not to initiate a court proceeding in response
to a labor complaint under Title IV of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83) (1959). The court found the secretary's stated reasons for
not acting to be inadequate, and remanded for reconsideration to be followed by either
action or an adequate explanation. Id. at 384.
49. The right to wear hair in a particular style and the right to free speech on
political questions will be accorded quite different levels of protection. See Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971),
50. Judge Wright distinguishes agency adjudication from rulemaking as major types
of action. Wright, supra note 39, at 381-84. At an extreme remove from both is a dis-
tinctively military action such as deciding which unit is to go into a battle. The first
two types of action call for a different judicial approach or review-and the latter for
no review at all. An alternative-rejected by Wright in the rulemaking context as in-
appropriate and inconsistent with Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 'U.S. 402 (1971)-is impo-
sition of strict procedural standards and no consideration of substance. Id. at 390-91.
51. Wright, supra note 39, at 391-92.
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requiring a "clear and convincing" showing of proof to support the
agency's finding.52
This distinction applies in an interesting way to the discharge for
homosexuality problem. Since the current Air Force regulation in
question allows discretionary waiver of discharge,53 the court will in-
quire into the circumstances closely because it has before it an "adjudi-
cation" of an individual case. The service's action is in reality three
actions: the board's determination that the individual is a homosexual,
the board's recommendation that he be discharged, and the command-
er's decision to order the discharge.
In Matlovich's case his homosexuality is stipulated.54 Such a
determination, were the fact in dispute, would be subject to normal
fairness standards for agency adjudications. The proper standard is
that "clear and convincing evidence" must appear in the record. The
two remaining actions involve four possible discretionary choices: the
board's recommendation that he be discharged; its fixing of the poorest
type of discharge the commander may order; 5 the commander's deci-
sion whether or not to execute the discharge; and his determination
whether or not to grant a better discharge than the board's recommenda-
tion.56
Once the fact of the man's homosexuality is established, these latter
determinations are very similar in nature to those of the agency in Wong
Wing Hang,5" the immigration case cited above. Judge Friendly's three
criteria (lack of rational explanation, inexplicable departure from the
norm, and impermissible basis) apply as they did in Wong, where the
decision was not to exercise the discretionary power to let the applicant
remain in the United States.58 Procedurally, the cases are exactly
parallel, since the Air Force is making a discretionary decision not to
exercise the power to let Matlovich remain in the service. The outcome,
as it was in Wong, is clear: upon any rationally acceptable factual
52. See id. at 390-91; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970).
53. AFM 39-12, Ch. 2, § H (Change 4, Oct. 21, 1970), together with Ch. 2, §
B (Change 10, May 20, 1975), establishes a presumption that the individual should be
discharged with an undesirable certificate where there are actual homosexual acts, but
grants the board authority to recommend otherwise.
54. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1975, § 1, at 15, col. 4.
55. The discharge authority can order a discharge even when retention is recom-
mended, but if he does so it must be an honorable discharge. He cannot, if the board
recommends discharge, direct a discharge less favorable than that recommended.
AFM 39-12, ch. 2, table 2-B-1, nn. 2, 3 (Change 10, May 20, 1975).
56. The commander has full discretionary authority in the "better" direction. Id.





showing5 that his continued presence endangers morale, the authority
structure or, perhaps, public confidence, the court cannot find it "so
wanting in rationality as to be an abuse of the discretion which Congress
vested [in the service]." 6°
Of course, this covers only the argument on due process grounds.
A discharged homosexual could raise equal protection arguments along
with the ill-defined 1 but nonetheless powerful privacy right against the
service's action. Such assertions ought to be subjected to a similar
analysis, defining the interests and balancing them according to their
importance, and might result in application of a stiffer test to the
governmental action.
Suppose alternatively the service's regulation simply required dis-
oharge of homosexuals without provision for discretionary retention.
This would bring into play the only review criteria applicable to rule-
making, namely that the court be satisfied the service has fairly consid-
ered all the factors"2 -including the importance to the individual of the
sexual preference right. Again, on due process grounds, we are at the
same point reaohed in the prior analysis: the service prevails unless its
actions can be termed an abuse of discretion. And again the equal
protection and privacy arguments, advanced to escalate the level of
required proof, will be raised and dealt with separately.
Judicial review of administrative rulemaking and adjudication in
the military is complicated where the service's judgment is closely relat-
ed to the combat function; for example, transfers into and out of a battle
zone. These are matters without direct parallel in civilian agency
action, but a rough analogy can be made to judicial deference to agency
expertise generally. The closer the military action is to combat, the
greater special knowledge can be attributed to the service and the less
proper is judicial intervention. The converse is also true: distance from
combat speaks for judicial assertiveness and independence of judgment.
This independence of judgment-the degree to which the court will
actively balance the competing interests-must vary with the interests at
stake. Therefore an explicit statement of those interests is in order.
59. The standard has been stated as "clear error of judgment" In re Josephson,
218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954), or "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable . . no rea-
sonable man would take the view," Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th
Cir. 1942). As Judge Friendly remarks in Wong, "[a] narrower meaning seems more
appropriate when a court is reviewing the exercise of discretion by an administrative
agency or an executive officer . . . particularly so when the relevant statute expressly
confides 'discretion' to the agency or officer ... " 360 F.2d at 718-19.
60. 360 F.2d at 719.
61. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and the numerous points
of view embodied in that decision.
62. Wright, supra note 39, at 381-84.
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H. The Mindes Criteria Revisited-Private Right, Private
Harm and Military Interest
A. Private Right, Private Harm
Mindes lists as its first two criteria the nature and strength of
plaintiff's interest, and the potential damage to him if relief is not
forthcoming. An overview of administrative actions that may threaten
legally cognizable rights, and thus of the manner in which the threat
arises, is useful. Administration of the military services involves a
variety of personnel actions, from discharge, or refusal to discharge, to
transfers or duty changes, that may involve rights of individuals. The
range of these possibilities is presented here in outline form for the sake
of space. They are set forth roughly in order of their severity or
potential impact on the individual, but the intent at this point is to
simply lay out rather than evalute the various items on the list. They
may be grouped under a few subheadings, as follows:
Figure I
Types of Administrative Actions
I. Administrative Discharge
A. The fact of discharge
B. The type of discharge





B. Nonrecommendation for promotion, for reenlistment or
retention
C. Unfavorable comments and evaluations (or insufficiently
favorable ones) on effectiveness and performance reports
D. Written reprimands and admonitions
IV. Status Actions
A. Security clearance investigation: refusal, withdrawal, down-
grading, or refusal to upgrade
B. Refusal (non-offer) of regular or career reserve status
C. Flying (or other specialized) status modification or with-
drawal
V. Duty Actions




B. Duty assignment or change of position; assignment of de-
tails; imposition of "extra training"
VI. Other Pressures
A. Nonapproval or extended review of requests for permissions,
meetings, events, publications, distributions, solicitations
B. Strict or selective enforcement or construction of directives
C. Inspections (including disguised searches)
D. Briefings, lectures, reprimands, admonitions
VII. Monetary Questions
A. Pay and dependency determinations
B. Financial liability to the government
This listing of actions is complete only in the sense that it presents
the general types that may be encountered. The impact of these actions
may involve immediate or prospective pecuniary damage, 3 or interfere
with liberties not easily quantifiable by dollar amount." Such action
may merely affect one's status within the military,65 may likely have
impact outside the service, or may involve damage not easily classified
within either of these categories. The court will also need to know why
the action was taken,66 what constitutional or other objection is asserted
against it,67 and whether procedural niceties were observed.6 8
63. Nonpromotion, or adverse pay or government property loss determinations, will
affect finances immediately; an administrative discharge, particularly one carrying an
other than honorable legend, may be severely damaging far into the future as well. See
Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83 YALE LJ. 33
(1973); Ervin, Military Administrative Discharges: Due Process in the Doldrums, 10
SAN DIEGO LR. 9 (1972).
64. An obvious example is freedom of speech.
65. Nonpromotion, nonselection to career status, etc., are examples.
66. Because the court is to decide if the determination is rationally (or perhaps
more closely) related to the purpose of the determining agency, it needs to know what
that purpose is.
67. Most rights will demand at least "rationality" to justify their infringement even
in the military context. Others, for instance First Amendment liberties, or certain equal
protection claims (race, alienage, and perhaps sex) may call for the higher "compelling"
standard or-in the military context-some judicially created middle ground. The dis-
tinction is critical, as exemplified in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). There
Justice Stewart, for the majority, subjected a gender-based difference in the tenure allow-
able under "up-or-out" statutes to a mere rationality test and found the distinction to
be based on real differences in opportunity enjoyed by the sexes. 419 U.S. at 508-09.
He distinguished Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), which had held that gender-based classifications imposed solely for ad-
ministrative convenience violate equal protection. His analysis rested on a finding that
a rational purpose (evening up of opportunities) existed apart from administrative con-
venience. 419 U.S. at 510. It might also be concluded that the Court reached this re-
sult because it had before it an instance of discrimination against men rather than
women.
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In the Matlovich case the action in question is an involuntary
discharge. Only the fact of discharge and not its character is in issue in
this case-- 69 but the manual governing enlisted administrative dis-
charges establishes a presumption that the discharge certificate should
be "undesirable," so that in most cases the character of discharge would
be a matter of concern as well. 70
The impact of the action has already been touched upon. As far
as we know the man was committed to a military career. That possibili-
ty is now foreclosed. The career-foreclosure is itself a deprivation;
along with it go income both present and future as well as the possibility
of military retirement. Less easily quantifiable, but certainly no less
important, are privacy and associational rights protected by the Consti-
tution. The service's regulation forces Matlovich to choose between
exercising those rights and continuing his career. The regulation and
the decision against discretionary waiver in his particular case may deny
him equal protection as well.71
B. Military Interest
The discussion above has covered the first two points of the test in
Mindes, defining the individual's position. Judge Clark's third point is
an assessment of the "type and degree of anticipated interference with
the military function." He explains:
Interference per se is insufficient [to justify abstention] since there
will always be some interference when review is granted, but if the
Justice Brennan, joined in dissent by Justices Douglas and Marshall, stated his be-
lief that gender-based classifications require "close judicial scrutiny" and the "compel-
ling" test, 419 U.S. at 511, and found that the classification in this case failed both tests.
Id. at 512, 517-18.
68. Where procedures are established by regulation or law, they must be observed
or due process is violated. See Bray v. United States, 515 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975);
Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), and cases cited therein.
69. The commander to whom the board reported decided to order an honorable
rather than the general discharge which the board had recommended.
70. AFM 39-12, Ch. 2, § H, para. 2-104b. (Change 4, Oct. 21, 1970) requires use
of Ch. 2, § B to process homosexuals' discharges where actual acts are involved. Sec.
B in turn establishes a presumption that an undesirable discharge is appropriate, but al-
lows better discharges where there is reason for granting them.
71. In outline, the equal protection argument would take homosexuals and hetero-
sexuals as classes (and would point out the difficulty of defining these classes with pre-
cision), and argue that there is no rational reason why all homosexuals, or why the in-
dividual in a particular case, must be discharged. Beyond this, there would be an argu-
ment following Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), and the dissent in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), that
sexual preference deserves the same expanded protection accorded race and alienage, or
at least the more stringent protection afforded gender in Reed.
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interference would be such as to seriously impede the military in
the performance of vital duties, it militates strongly against relief. 72
To ask the seriousness of interference, however, is to ask first the
threshold question: what is the military function? Only after it is
defined can its importance be assessed and the degree of possible
impediment created by review be examined. Without this, the third
part of the Mindes test is either an unreasonably stiff standard 71 or an
incantation which could mask virtually complete abdication of the re-
view function."'
1. Valid Interests
The military shares many interests with civilian agencies: efficien-
cy, a degree of discipline necessary to maintain that efficiency, adminis-
trative convenience and morale-getting assigned tasks done with mini-
mum cost and maximum speed and effectiveness. 75  Shared also is an
implicit interest in the appearance of fairness and good sense that
underlies morale and, through it, effectiveness.
Unlike other administrative agencies, the military services are also
supposed to be fighting forces.70  This distinguishing characteristic of
the military gives rise to additional interests whose recognition underlies
the judicial tradition of noninterference. Identification of at least the
most important interests is possible, as is acknowledgement that each
justifies certain kinds of restrictions on what would otherwise be clear-
cut legally cognizable rights.
The first and most obvious of these singularly military interests is
72. 453 F.2d at 201 (emphasis added).
73. A court would feel free to act so long as it did not "seriously interfere with
vital duties"-a quite intrusive standard.
74. A court so inclined could easily find this elastic wording loose enough to en-
compass practically all service actions. The parallel to clear and present danger as a
standard is obvious. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and
Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. Cr. REv. 41
(1969).
The most reasonable position-and the one intended by the court, though by no
means the one all courts would be expected to extract from Judge Clark's words-is that
this phrase should be read literally, as a statement of when the court should not inquire
at all. When an act of reviewing would seriously impede vital duties in certain in-
stances, review in those instances is not proper. But absent that showing, a less abso-
lute, balancing approach is called for.
75. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974).
76. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975), quoting United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955): "[Ilt is the primary business of armies and
navies to fight or be ready to fight .... ." See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.
83, 94 (1953); United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344
(1972); United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954).
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the need for a peculiar type of discipline. 7 Military discipline is a habit
and pattern of obedience, required in combat but nurtured largely
outside combat. The extent to which this pattern must be maintained in
noncombat situations is problematical, but combat and disciplinary
needs arising from it are the most important characteristics distinguish-
ing the military from other organizations. Therefore, the services' own
judgments about the requirement for maintaining combat-type discipline
outside combat are properly accorded weight by courts, consistent with
the general principle of judicial deference to administrative expertise.
Accordingly, the closer the decision is to actual combat, the greater the
propriety of deference. 78
However, the decision to use certain devices outside combat to
produce the combat-required obedience pattern is a rational determina-
tion and therefore subject to judicial oversight. When radical changes
in society, in the relative size of the military establishment, and in the
composition of the forces themselves are taken into account, 70 it seems
appropriate for courts to reexamine traditional discipline-creating prac-
tices to see if there is evidence that they still tend to produce that
discipline.
There are other interests related to discipline which are common
to civilian organizations, but which may differ in the military context.
Morale and the need for security are two of these. Their importance
seems self-evident. But where a military determination detracting from
individual rights is based on these interests, and the service seeks to
impose greater restrictions than could be imposed on civilians, the in-
creased restrictions should be related to some distinctly military need.
Another military interest related to discipline is maintenance of the
authority structure and corollary rules regulating the conduct of those
in positions of authority. The services preserve their rank structure in
part by regulating such persons' conduct so that it does not undermine
discipline.80  A case currently in the federal courts puts in issue the
permissible scope of such regulation.81  In this case an officer, by
circulating among enlisted men a petition challenging the Air Force's
haircut policy, gave notice to the men that he disagreed with the policy.
His disagreement might pose a greater threat to discipline than would
similar conduct by an enlisted man, espetially if the implication were
77. "An Army is not a deliberative body. . . . Its law is that of obedience." In
re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890). Obedience is the keynote.
78. See text following note 62 supra.
79. Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 781-83 (1974) (Justice Stewart, dissenting).
80. Cf. id. at 744. General George Marshall addressed this question in a letter
which then Representative Jacob Javits read into the Congressional Record in 1951. 97
Cong. Rec. A4977 (1951).
81. Glines v. Wade, 401 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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present that the officer would not enforce the existing regulation. A
different free speech standard may therefore be properly applied to him
than to enlisted personnel.8 -
There are two further interests of the services that are not related to
combat discipline as such. They are vital in the relationship that exists
between the service and the civilian population it serves. The first is
subordination of the military to civilian control, and the second is
confidence of the population in the military, especially during wartime.
Subordination of the military is a fundamental principle in our
scheme of government. It finds expression most visibly in an organiza-
tional structure that places civilians in formal control of all military
activities: the service secretaries, secretary of defense, and the president.
It also emerges in several of the articles of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.8 3
Civilian confidence in the military-home front morale-is neces-
sary in time of war. It is also necessary to a degree in peacetime,
although a healthy skepticism is also needed to produce armed forces in
which the people can sensibly be confident during a conflict. Military
judgments as to which service policies maintain civilian confidence are
particularly susceptible to judicial review since civilian courts do have a
sense for what civilians think, and can legitimately arrive at their own
conclusions.
The governmental-military interests sketched above are legitimate
ones, and insofar as they are validly applied are not simply the particu-
laristic desires of a separate military establishment, but rather are vital
interests of the society as a whole. The legitimate requirements of
military discipline can and must impose restrictions on what are other-
wise inviolable rights.
Returning to the homosexual discharge case, the next step in the
court's analysis would be consideration of the military interests that may
be involved. First is combat discipline. Homosexuality as such has
nothing to do with combat discipline. Problems resulting from the reac-
tion of others to the homosexual service member do arise and may affect
morale, mutual respect and maintenance of the authority structure. But
the fact of homosexuality has no necessary effect on the individual's own
obedience reactions. and discipline. The matter is best dealt with
under the morale and authority structure interests, discussed below,
82. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 762-
65 (1974) overstates the difference, but some exists.
83. See N. at 751. Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
prohibits officers from speaking contemptuously about the president and some other of-
fice holders. 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1956).
84. See note 77 supra and text accompanying.
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rather than as a discipline question per se. With even greater dispatch,
we can eliminate the interest in subordination to civilian control as
irrelevant.
We can assume, however, that most of the population, and most
servicemembers, are heterosexual and probably regard other preferences
as at best odd and at worst criminal or sinful. Whatever the merits of
gay liberation and the eventual outcome of the controversy, acceptance
of gay servicemembers would certainly raise serious questions in the
areas of morale, public confidence and authority-structure maintenance.
These questions need answers, and the answers can be provided by the
Matlovich and related cases if the courts and parties address the problem
squarely rather than relying on shopworn authority.
The governmental interests can be outlined more fully, if not
definitively: many people are hostile to and uncomfortable with homo-
sexuality. Presence of homosexuals could threaten morale and civilian
confidence, and be potentially disruptive. It might also threaten the
authority structure if straight subordinates had contempt for, disliked, or
were uncomfortable with, gay superiors. There are other untoward
possibilities if the roles are reversed. However, the degree to which
government ought to accede to the popular hostility to homosexuality
needs to be addressed as well. Is the protection of internal morale and
public confidence valid if based on questionable popular prejudices? On
the other -hand, the services may have some obligation to discourage
homosexuality as an aberration from commonly held values. 5 But this
is dangerous ground.
The final governmental interest is security, an interest long used to
justify discharges of individuals who concealed their homosexuality until
caught. The concern is that blackmail is possible where such a matter
is concealed, and therefore that information known or available to a
homosexual might be extracted by an enemy agent. The theory has
merit where sexual preference is concealed, as it still is in the preponder-
ance of cases. But it has no weight where, as with Leonard Matlovich,
the preference is open and unconcealed.
2. Nonlegitimate Interests
Certain rationales for administrative actions have recurred in the
cases but do not legitimately justify violation of individual rights. The
most obvious of these is the personal or vindictive motive of the deci-
85. The tone and content of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 762-65 (1974), joined in by Chief Justice Burger, indicates that at least some
members of the Supreme Court consider enforcement of the common morality a proper
function of the judiciary.
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sion-maker. Courts should be aware of this possibility when assessing
apparently valid administrative choices. In many circumstances, in fact,
assertions of vindictiveness are singularly appropriate as issues to be
raised by a plaintiff after the service has made a case on the basis of one
of the valid justifications discussed above. Such questions will always
be ones of fact approachable through normal judicial methods.86
Another illegitimate purpose, but one difficult to distinguish in
concrete cases from the legitimate interest in discipline, is the perpetua-
tion of tradition. Inertia is not manifest solely in physics. Particular
traditional practices assertedly necessary to the maintenance of discipline
ought to be subjected to at least some scrutiny upon a showing that they
deprive individuals of protected rights. Courts need to decide, as they
have done in some instances,8 7 whether such a traditional practice does
in fact serve the asserted end. Naturally the factual determination in a
particular case will be difficult, as it will be in the Matlovich situation.
But it should nevertheless be possible to rationally assess the competing
arguments.
Perhaps the most dangerous illegitimate purpose is the use of
administrative rules and decisions to effect a separatism between mili-
tary personnel and civilians. Those familiar with service life will second
the notion that a distinct emphasis on separateness exists. Certain
service practices may put pressure on individuals to partake in a "total
institution" holding values which are different from those of the rest of
the nation and have no defensible purpose.88
Of course, certain military values may be different from common
civilian ones, 89 but these are for the most part subsumed under the
military-governmental interests explored above. Use of the service's
coercive powers to inculcate other values is ultra vires, and should be
checked by the courts.
86. There is of course serious question as to when and to what degree courts ought
to inquire into the motives of co-equal bodies. Compare Ely, Legislative and Adminis-
trative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE UJ. 1205 (1970) with Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 S. CT. REV. 95 (1971). Many of the reasons for reluctance are absent where the
decision or act is that of an individual. This would cover the bulk of the determinations
in question here.
87. A good example is the overturning of "mandatory worship" at the Air Force
Academy in Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
88. Justice Douglas alludes to this concept of homogeneity in his dissent in Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 770 (1974). See Comment, Military Discipline and Political
Expression: A New Look at an Old Bugbear, 6 HARv. Civ. RTs.-Crv. LM. L. Rv. 525,
532 (1971).
89. Obedience, which distinguishes military from civilian discipline, is one such
value.
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I. The Process of Review-Jurisdiction, Discretion
and Balancing
A. Jurisdiction
It might seem self-evident that where constitional rights are at stake
courts will -have jurisdiction to hear the issues. But there is a pervasive
split of authority as to whether any of the available statutes confer
jurisdiction to review military administrative determinations.
The Supreme Court in a leading case in the field 1 held that habeas
corpus, while a proper tool to review the propriety of an individual's
subjection to military control, could not be used to examine an assign-
ment decision. By a similar process of reasoning, no internal decision
of a service would be subject to review on habeas corpus." The other
possible bases for jurisdiction are the mandamus9: and federal ques-
tion94 statutes, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sections
providing for judicial review.95
The no-jurisdiction school is typified by the district court opinion
on remand in Yahr v. Resor.96 After the circuit court had remanded
for the lower tribunal to consider the merits of plaintiffs' claim that the
local commander's refusal of permission to distribute an "underground"
newspaper was unconstitutional, there was no hearing on the merits.
Ignoring the Fourth Circuit's clear suggestion that it should review, the
district court, in this case involving very important First Amendment
political publication rights, narrowly construed its authority under both
the APA and the federal question statute. It held, following a District
of Columbia appellate decision, that:
the action of the defendants involves a decision of a Commanding
General concerning the maintenance of loyalty, discipline, and mo-
rale among Army troops under his command. Such action clearly
90. Aside from the district court in Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C.
1972), some courts have recently refused to acknowledge jurisdiction: Bramblett v. Des-
obry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1974); McGee v. Schlesinger, 378 F. Supp. 318 (W.D.
Tex. 1974). But others have found jurisdiction in similar factual situations: Friedman
v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972); Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp. 198
(E.D. Va. 1973); Klinkhammer v. Richardson, 359 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1973); as
well as Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
91. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
92. Because the extraordinary writ is available only to question the propriety of
continued subjection to military control, once that propriety is established further inquiry
on the basis of habeas corpus is foreclosed. See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83
(1953).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
95. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 provides for judicial review of administrative agency deci-
sions.
96. 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
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involves a question of national security and such questions are pre-
cluded from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act..97
The court thus refused to acknowledge jurisdiction under the APA,
against the contrary implication by its own circuit court in the same
case, in what is submitted was a clear misreading of the statute in
question. 8 The court then noted that plaintiffs had offered no proof of
dollar loss, and taking a myopic view of the First Amendment rights at
stake held that they were not intrinsically valuable enough to meet the
ten thousand dollar minimum required for federal question jurisdic-
tion.9
Mandamus actions have received similarly short shrift from some
courts. The quintessential holding is that mandamus does not lie to
review discretionary decisions, however palpable the constitutional dep-
rivation. Some courts have taken a less absolute stance, holding that
discretion must be exercised within bounds set by notions of fair play
and due process.' In short, an exercise of discretion cannot be
arbitrary or capricious. This seems the better view. Decision-makers
cannot be required to reach any particular decision, but they can, and
must, be required to reach their eventual decision justly. This position
is consistent with an understanding of the decision-making process as a
rational choice of alternatives, rather than as a nonrational choice
among logically indistinguishable options. The latter position, as point-
ed out above, 1 1 is proper only where the options truly are not subject to
logical differentiation-an unusual circumstance.
A number of cases concerning military reservists' hair and appear-
ance -have dealt with the jurisdiction question, and the courts hearing
them have predictably disagreed. In Garmon v. Warner,12 a 1973
decision striking down the Marine Corps Reserve's ban on short-hair
wigs worn to hide longer hair, the judge explored the federal question
statute and the Administrative Procedure Act provisions, as well as
mandamus, and found that all fairly applied to the case before him.
Regarding the federal question statute, he noted that the threatened
action, callup to active duty for noncompliance, would easily produce
$10,000 in individual damages. 10 3 The defense asserted that the APA
97. Id. at 967. The court cited Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
98. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 701 exclude from scrutiny military authority exercised in the
field or occupied territory in wartime-no more.
99. 339 F. Supp. at 968-69. Admittedly, that position is probably in accord with
the majority view.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80, 86 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
101. See notes 44-46 supra and text accompanying.
102. 358 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
103. Id. at 208.
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provision could not independently confer jurisdiction, but he refused to
conclude that Congress had intended another "unfortunate gap" in
federal jurisdiction."' Finally, he characterized his proposed action on
the issue of mandamus as one which required the defendant Marine
officers to recognize plaintiffs' constitutional rights, rather than as one
whioh would require defendants to perform any discretionary act. 105
The Garmon decision followed a widely quoted case finding in
favor of jurisdiction, Friedman v. Froehlke.06 In Friedman, the First
Circuit summarily dealt with an Air Force assertion that the courts
cannot review regulations, and stated that defendants "confuse the issue
of jurisdiction with the scope of review."' 1 7 After noting the mandate
of Orloff, the court reasoned:
If Orloffs staking out of an exclusive military jurisdiction to deter-
mine "legitimate Army matters" is to have any other meaning than
that the Army may determine any matter which it sees fit to deter-
mine, there must exist a, minimal burden to bring the determina-
tion within the boundaries of legitimacy.' 08
This clearly raises one question that is begged by the contrary
opinions-whether a determination is genuinely of a -legitimate Army
matter" and, if so, whether the determination was arrived at in at least a
minimally rational way. The positions taken in Friedman, Garmon and
the other concurring cases are persuasive. Even under the strictures of
Orloff, it seems proper for a civilian court to exercise its power to
protect servicemembers' constitutional rights, and to subject military
decisions to review at some level commensurate with the peculiar posi-
tion of the military services.
B. Discretion and Balancing
The remaining Mindes criteria involve the degree to which certain
questions may be left to military discretion, and the possible interference
with military duties which judicial intervention might cause. But the
degree of discretion of the service cannot be stated a priori. Rather, it is
a function of the interests at stake, and of the relative knowledgeability
of military authorities and the court.
The distinction drawn above between the nonrational and rational
meanings of discretion'0" suggests that a court's first task will be to
decide into which category the matter at issue fits. The criterion is
simple: a decision is nonreviewable if and only if it is between choices
104. Id.
105. Id. at 209.
106. 470 F.2d 1351 (lstCir. 1972).
107. Id. at 1352n.1.
108. Id. at 1353.
109. See notes 44-46 supra and text accompanying.
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that are not rationally differentiable. All other decisions are subject to
judicial review.
Next, in a reviewable case, the court must define the nature and
importance of the military interest:" 0 any particular military expertise
with respect to the subject matter; the opposing individual interests; and
the court's own expertise about the matter at hand. The listing of
administrative actions and the individual interests set forth earlier can
help to define the individual's stake. Various general administrative
and peculiarly military interests can give similar definition to the mili-
tary side. Once the interests have been isolated, the court must assess
the relative expertise of the miltiary decision-maker" and the court with
regard to the military interest and the way the administrative action
furthers that interest. This protects the substance of military discretion
without establishing it as a talisman.
The court's freedom in striking a balance between competing
interests is circumscribed by the nature of those interests. The scope of
review will be broad where the individual's interest is significant and
that of the service weak. This is particularly true where the court has
independent expertise about the military interest and the way it is served
by the administrative action."' In such a case the burden of proof falls
on the service to justify its administrative act. The burden of proof
would be high. It might be framed in words from Mindes:"2 Only if
judicial interference would seriously impede vital military functions, and
if the action is clearly necessary to accomplishing the function, should
the court refuse relief.
Conversely, where interests clearly weigh in favor of the service,
and particularly where the court lacks expertise of its own, scope of
review will be narrow and the burden reversed. An aggrieved individu-
al must affirmatively show that the justification advanced by the service,
or appearing in the history of the regulation, law, practice or act, has no
rational basis or that an unacceptable motive lay at its base.
The court should of course require that some justification actually
appear, and not act on the basis of its own imagination or supposi-
tions." 3 On the basis of such justification for the military administra-
110. This includes possible congressional "commitment" of certain matters to the au-
thority of the service. But such commitment is circumscribed by the constitutional limi-
tations that protect individual rights. Congress cannot infringe individual rights indi-
rectly (by conferring a right to do so on the military services) to any greater degree
than it can directly.
111. The best example is the service's and the court's processes of evaluating how a
given practice or decision may affect civilian attitudes toward the service.
112. See 453 F.2dat201.
113. The majority's use of "equalization" theory in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.s.
498 (1975), is suspect under this principle, as the dissenters point out.
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tive decision, a plaintiff would be required to negate each justification,
carrying the burden of proving that each was irrational. In some
instances it may be appropriate for the court, having initially assessed
the quality of interests on both sides, simply to refuse further review,
where the act of review would itself be detrimental to important military
interests.' 14
In most cases presented to a court, however, neither party's inter-
ests will be paramount. Here a reasoned outcome can be reached by
applying a balancing process. The court should first consider the type
of administrative action involved and the nature of the individual rights
which it threatens, as well as the importance of those rights and the
degree of harm which will be suffered if relief is not granted. The court
should similarly consider which military interest it is that requires the
service to take the action in question. This includes examination of
how the action serves the state interest.
The court's judgment about the individual and service interests
should be supported by evidence and information before the tribunal. In
most cases, substantial evidence seems appropriate as a test. Deference
should be accorded a military determination which is supported by
evidence not effectively countered by the individual. Such a test would
minimally burden the service, yet leave room for disproof of supposed
facts where they are not, or have ceased to be, true.
Throughout the process the court should adopt an independence of
judgment consistent with its own expertise in the crucial matters: the
importance of the interests, the degree of potential harm on each side,
the logical connection between administrative action and military inter-
est, and particularly the persuasiveness of evidence relating to that
connection. Where the court's own expertise is considerable, as it is for
example in weighing the effect on civilian attitudes of certain practices,
it is appropriate for the court to be intrusive; the converse is true where
the matter relates closely to the combat role and combat discipline.
Conclusion
This scheme for judicial review of military administrative decisions
leans heavily on a threshold characterization and valuation of the inter-
ests involved. It also relies on traditional judicial tools for determining
the allocation of burden of proof and degree of proof required. If it is
workable, it should lead to a reasoned conclusion in the Matlovich case
and others.
Certain of the discharged homosexual's interests are the same as
those of plaintiff in Mindes: the questions of taking without due process
114. E.g., an injunction barring the Navy from sending a ship into a combat area.
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of financial rights and expectations. In addition, the homosexual ad-
vances privacy, associational and right-to-be-left-alone interests as de-
serving of the court's protection. These personal rights in particular are
of great significance.
The governmental interests are also important. Morale and the
authority structure are vital underpinnings of the desired end product,
namely, discipline in combat. The civilian community's view of the
services must also be accorded weight. While the military can lead
public opinion to a degree, as it did with racial integration, it cannot
divorce itself entirely from contemporary standards. Military standards
must avoid extremes, both reactionary and avant-garde.
The problem of homosexual service members is not one in which
either party's interests visibly overpower the other's. Therefore, the
positions need to be examined in detail. The interests on both sides
have been defined in the preceding discussion, and the question comes
down to one of factual proof.
Absent an evidentiary record it is perhaps futile to predict an
outcome in the Matlovich case. It is reasonable to assume that the
government will show successfully that blanket acceptance of homosex-
uals into the service would be intolerably disruptive of morale and the
authority structure. The service might also show similar harm with
respect to civilian attitudes toward the service, but here, of course, the
court would adopt greater independence of judgment. On the other
hand, Sergeant Matlovich might well prove to the court's satisfaction
that, in his particular case, no such disruptions would occur, or that they
would not be significant enough to overcome his substantial personal
interests. The court could conclude on such showings that -the regula-
tion's direction to discharge homosexuals is valid, but that in application
to Matlovich, and by extension in all other individual cases, it must be
more flexibly construed to conform to individual situations. The serv-
ices would then be required to make individual determinations, a rea-
sonable requirement in light of the very significant constitutional rights
at stake.
The critical point, however, is not the outcome in any particular
case, which is dependent on the facts of that case, but the process by
which that outcome is reached. Traditional judicial tools are as work-
able when a court is considering military administrative decisions and
actions as they are in other areas. They should be used.
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